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Abstract 
Systemic risk is the risk of collapse of the financial system resulting from inter-linkages, such that 
the failure of individual entities or the collapse of an individual market can cause a cascading 
failure. The essence of systemic risk is interconnectedness. Theory gives some guidance: if 
negative shocks are small, a more densely connected financial network spreads risk and 
enhances financial stability. But beyond a certain point, dense interconnections support 
transmission and propagation of shocks, hence a more fragile financial system. Direct 
interconnectedness may arise from counterparty relationships and exposures, whether on the 
asset or the liability side. Indirect interconnectedness may arise when entities have common 
exposures, so that if one is forced into fire sales, the fall in asset prices affects the balance sheets 
of others. Indirect interconnectedness is also a feature of collateral chains, in which entities that 
have no direct relationship are nevertheless linked because one holds collateral originating from 
the other. Reputational risk can also connect an entity whose reputation suffers a blow (e.g. 
suspicion of illegal activity) to others believed to share similar characteristics, though they have 
no direct institutional or transactional relationship. In many such cases, there may be a danger of 
contagion. Particular concerns arise in derivatives markets, securities financing transactions 
(SFTs), wholesale funding markets, leveraged open‑ended funds doing significant maturity or 
liquidity transformation, and central counterparties. In all these cases, the first step must be to get 
data that document the interconnectedness. This amounts to “mapping” the shadow banking 
system, i.e. documenting and analysing interconnectedness. That is essential to advance our 
understanding not only of shadow banking, but also of the overall environment within which 
Capital Markets Union (CMU) is to progress. 
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This paper will discuss interconnectedness among financial institutions (entities) and across financial markets, with 
particular attention to the shadow banking system. 
Even the term “system” here suggests a range of 
interconnections and interdependencies, which 
are deep and complex. Our data on these entities 
and activities are still very limited and are often 
accumulating unprocessed, despite major initiatives 
to throw light on the shadows. I shall focus 
primarily on the European Union (EU), where 
the latest collection and analysis of the data are 
in the EU Shadow Banking Monitor (European 
Systemic Risk Board – ESRB, 2017). Some of the 
issues are closely related to the EU drive for Capital 
Markets Union (CMU) launched with an action 
plan in 2015 (European Commission, 2015).
CMU may be broadly understood as non‑bank 
financial integration. Both price and quantity 
composite indicators of the degree of financial 
integration in Europe, starting from 1995, 
show considerable rises to a peak in 2006, then 
disintegration accentuated by the crisis to a trough 
in 2012 (European Central Bank – ECB, 2017). 
Integration has since resumed, but the indices 
are still not back to their 2006 levels. Roughly 
the same is true for individual subindices for 
bond and equity markets, except that both show 
troughs also in 2003. The analysis here, however, 
will exclude bond and equity markets, with the 
main attention to shadow banking and derivatives 
markets. Also, we shall not be concerned with 
individual entities – from a policy viewpoint, we 
are concerned with macroprudential rather than 
microprudential oversight.
We need definitions to proceed. Unfortunately, 
they are not precise. CMU is the move towards 
deeper and more integrated capital markets 
to complement bank financing – a true single 
market for market‑based finance in Europe, with 
no barriers at national borders. Shadow banking 
has been defined as “market‑based (or non‑bank) 
financial intermediation”, but this is much too 
broad, because taken literally it does include 
bond and equity markets. The Financial Stability 
Board (FSB, 2017) regards shadow banking as 
“credit intermediation involving entities and 
activities (fully or partly) outside of the regular 
banking system”. Again, this seems very inclusive. 
The European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) 
is considerably less so (while using the term 
“broad”): “The broad measure of shadow banking 
in the EU, comprising total assets of investment 
funds, including money market funds (MMFs) 
and other financial institutions, amounted to 
EUR 40 trillion at the end of the third quarter 
of 2016. This measure includes all entities of 
the financial sector except banks, insurance 
corporations and pension funds.” Here markets 
are clearly not entities, if only because they 
do not have assets as included in the “broad 
measure”. On the other hand, the exclusion of 
insurance corporations and pension funds may 
be difficult to justify, whether analytically or for 
policy purposes.
In contrast to the slowdown in shadow banking in 
the United States, the rapid growth of the sector 
resumed in Europe after 2007‑09. The demand 
for its services has come mainly from institutions 
and corporates seeking “safe” but non‑zero yields. 
The huge growth in managed assets has led to 
a major expansion of the amounts channelled 
into shadow banking. On the supply side, much 
of the activity comes from regulatory arbitrage: 
developing organisational forms and transaction 
strategies that avoid regulation. This often 
involves substitution of shadow banking for 
“traditional” banks. It poses problems because it 
is not formally supported by safety nets yet may 
require bailouts. This creates moral hazard and 
a form of implicit subsidy. 
Section 1 considers interconnectedness and 
systemic risk. Section 2 specifies the costs and 
benefits of interconnectedness. One cost is 
contagion, explored in Section 3. Section 4 
details the risks associated with interconnectedness. 
Section 5 concludes with a discussion of available 
and forthcoming data and their use.
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1| Interconnectedness and systemic risk
Interconnectedness is ubiquitous in the financial 
system, and it is key to systemic risk. The system 
is endangered if stress in an individual entity or 
activity is transmitted widely through various forms 
of interconnection. This is often called contagion, 
and we shall consider it below. A fundamental issue 
in evaluating financial integration is the balance 
between its benefits – more efficient allocation of 
capital, risk sharing – and the potential dangers 
posed by interconnectedness. When we think 
in systemic terms of the build‑up of financial 
stress and vulnerability, our concerns arise from 
interconnectedness. With systemic vulnerabilities, 
shocks may propagate across wholesale funding 
markets, derivatives markets, and securities 
financing transactions (SFT). 
Systemic risk is the risk of potential collapse of 
financial system resulting from interlinkages such 
that the failure of individual entities or collapse of 
a market can cause a cascading failure. Individual 
shadow banking entities may not seem large relative 
to major banks (still, recall American International 
Group's [AIG’s] credit default swap [CDS] market 
presence before the crisis or consider BlackRock’s 
balance sheet now). But tremors in the money 
market fund (MMF) sector, for example, can 
easily be transmitted.
A recent theoretical analysis (Acemoglu et al., 2015) 
finds that if negative shocks are small, a more densely 
connected financial network spreads risk and enhances 
financial stability. But beyond a certain size of shock, 
dense interconnections support transmission and 
propagation of shocks, hence a more fragile financial 
system. This seems to contrast with the early paper of 
Allen and Gale (2000), which finds that a network 
in which all nodes are connected to all others – a 
“complete” network – will be more stable than an 
incomplete network. But the complete network 
is an extreme case, and the earlier paper does not 
distinguish the size of the shock, which is key to 
the later results. Gai and Kapadia (2010) obtain 
results similar to Acemoglu et al. 
So dense interconnectedness may be a source 
of systemic risk if the shocks are large enough. 
What is “large enough”? Ex post, the failure 
of Lehman qualifies. But the “taper tantrum” 
and “flash crashes” of recent years were not, nor 
even the crisis in Cyprus. On the other hand, 
the discovery of a huge fiscal hole in Greece 
seemed to threaten the entire euro area financial 
system, to the point where the authorities 
were convinced of the need for a massive 
bailout. Suppose there had been at that time 
a true CMU, at least in the eurozone. Might 
the risks have been distributed sufficiently 
widely, or at least less towards banks and more 
towards non‑bank finance, so that the expected 
impact of a Greek default would have been 
considerably less threatening? Or would asset 
managers holding Greek debt have been hit so 
hard that their European bank parents would 
have been imperilled? These questions suggest 
how important it is to have the data needed to 
map the European shadow banking system and 
its interconnections with the banks.
We must distinguish between direct and indirect 
interconnectedness. The former refers to direct 
counterparty relationships and the consequent 
exposures on balance sheets. The latter may 
include relationships induced for entities with 
common exposures, when an action by entity A 
(e.g. “fire sale”) will affect the mark‑to‑market 
value of the assets of B; collateral chains, in 
which collateral offered by A to B may through a 
further transaction by B with C put this collateral 
on C’s balance sheet, so we now have an indirect 
connection between A and C, in which A is 
exposed to the risk that C may not be able to 
deliver the collateral to B; reputational risk, 
when an action by A may harm the reputation 
of B, which is linked to it not as a counterparty, 
but only by having some perceived common 
characteristics or ownership link; and step‑in 
risk, if A were to have to support B, to which it 
has perceived ties beyond contractual obligations 
to B that could induce reputational damage 
to A if B were to fail.
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A particular form of direct interconnectedness 
is ownership, and this may be a link between 
banks and asset managers in the shadow banking 
system. In Europe, banks and insurers have 
significant ownership stakes in asset managers 
that are important in the shadow banking system 
(see Chart 1). FSB (2017, Section 3) has an 
extensive survey of interconnectedness between 
banks and other financial institutions, mainly asset 
managers and funds. In the context of CMU, 
the country aggregate data in Chart 2 are of 
particular interest. They show that of EU countries, 
the United Kingdom (UK) and Ireland have the 
highest links between banks and other financial 
institutions (OFIs)1 on assets and liabilities; Belgium 
shows especially high claims of banks on OFIs as a 
share of the banking sector’s assets. Chart 3 shows 
that six of the top 25 asset managers (by assets 
in eurozone) are domiciled outside the eurozone 
– indeed, two of the five largest. But we see 
no proposals of CMU with the United States. 
1 Other financial 
institutions (OFIs) here 
include all non‑bank 
financial intermediation 
except pension funds and 
insurers: so trust companies, 
money market funds, 
hedge funds, equity funds, 
bond funds, and mixed funds. 
C1  Aggregate net assets of the top 25 asset management companies 
in the European Union
(Q4 2016; total net assets in EUR billions)
Bank-owned Insurer-owned Independent
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
US FR US DE DEFR FR FRSE US UK CH DE US CH IT DE IT US US USUK UK UK NO
Source: European Systemic Risk Board – ESRB, EU Shadow Banking Monitor 2017, p. 43.
Primary sources: Thomson Reuters Lipper and European Central Bank calculations.
Notes: Asset managers are classified as held by banks/insurers when the asset manager is a subsidiary of 
the bank/insurer (this excludes cases where bank/insurance activities are a subordinate business of the group 
or where the holding company also holds banks/insurers) or has a bank/insurer as a majority shareholder. 
The horizontal axis shows the domicile of the asset manager.
See list of countries below.
C2  Banks’ interconnectedness to other financial institutions (OFIs)
(end-2015, % of bank assets)
Banks funding riska) Banks credit riskb)
0
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BR CL ZA UK BEKY IT TRKR CH IE NL FR RU US ES AR AU MX CA HKIN ID DE SA
Source: Financial Stability Board, Global Shadow Banking Monitoring – Report 2016, p. 33.
a) Banks’ liabilities to OFIs as a share of bank assets.
b) Banks’ claims on OFIs as a share of bank assets.
Note: See list of countries below.
List of countries (Charts 1 and 2; Table 1)
AR: Argentina
AU: Australia
BE: Belgium
BR: Brazil
CA: Canada
CH: Switzerland
CL: Chile
DE: Germany
ES: Spain
FR: France
HK: Hong Kong
ID: Indonesia
IE: Ireland
IN: India
IT: Italy
JE: Jersey
JP: Japan
KR: Korea
KY: Cayman Islands
LU: Luxembourg
MX: Mexico
NL: Netherlands
NO: Norway
RU: Russia
SA: Saudi Arabia
SE: Sweden
TR: Turkey
UK: United Kingdom
US: United States
ZA: South Africa
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T1  Distribution of European Union institutions' exposures to shadow banking entities by country of domicile  
and type of shadow banking entity
(weighted by size of exposure)
Country/type 
of “shadow 
banking entity”
UCITS MMFs Non‑UCITS 
MMFs
Non‑MMF 
investment 
funds
Finance 
companies
Broker‑dealers Credit 
insurers/
financial 
guarantors
Securitisation Non‑equivalent 
bank/insurers
Other Total
DE 0.0 0.0 3.7 1.0 0.0 0.0 1.2 0.0 0.4 6.3
ES 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.1 0.3 0.0 0.1 0.7
FR 0.7 0.0 0.5 0.6 0.0 0.0 2.2 0.0 0.4 4.5
GB 0.0 0.4 2.5 2.0 0.4 0.5 2.2 0.0 2.4 10.5
HK 0.1 0.0 0.5 0.0 0.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 1.3
IE 0.0 0.0 0.8 0.7 0.0 0.0 4.5 0.0 0.3 6.3
JE 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.0 2.7 0.0 0.0 3.0
JP 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.1 0.6 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.2 1.5
KR 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.9 0.5 2.6
KY 0.0 0.0 3.4 0.7 0.0 0.0 1.8 0.1 0.5 6.5
LU 0.3 0.0 2.3 0.7 0.2 0.0 1.2 0.0 0.4 5.2
NL 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.6 0.0 0.0 1.5 0.0 0.1 2.5
RU 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.7 0.1 1.9
TR 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.0 0.0 3.5
US 0.7 0.2 4.0 8.2 0.3 0.3 7.1 1.6 4.7 27.1
EU othera) 0.1 0.0 2.0 1.4 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.1 0.3 4.4
RW otherb) 0.0 0.1 1.9 1.2 0.6 0.6 0.8 4.4 2.5 12.1
Total 2.0 0.9 22.3 18.2 2.8 1.4 26.2 13.3 13.0 100.0
Source: Abad et al. “Mapping the interconnectedness between EU banks and shadow banking entities”, ESRB Working Paper Series, No. 40, March 2017.
a) Other European Union countries.
b) Rest of the world.
Note: See list of countries on the previous page. GB : Great Britain.
C3  Top 25 asset management companies, ownership by sector
(Q3 2015; total net assets in EUR billions; share in the Lipper IM sample in %)
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7%
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1: BlackRock
2: Amundi Group
3: Deutsche Bank
4: JP Morgan
5: Union Gruppe
6: UBS Group
7: Unicredit
8: F. Templeton
9: Eurizon Fin Group
10: Allianz Group
11: Goldman Sachs
12: Dekabank
13: Fil International
14: Schroders
15: Groupe BPCE
16: Nordea
17: BNP Paribas
18: Pimco
19: Fortis Group
20: Pictet & Cie
21: BNY Mellon Group
22: KBC Group NV
23: HSBC Holdings
24: Axa
25: ING Groep
Bank Insurer Independent
Source: Thomson Reuters Lipper for Investment Management (Lipper IM); European Central Bank calculations.
Notes: Asset managers are classified as held by banks/insurers when the asset manager is a subsidiary of the bank/insurer (this excludes cases where 
bank/insurance activities are a subordinate business of the group or where the holding company also holds banks/insurers) or have a bank/insurer as 
a majority shareholder. 
6 Banque de France Financial Stability Review No. 22 - April 2018 - Non-bank finance: trends and challenges
Interconnectedness: mapping the shadow banking system
Richard Portes
More seriously, there are issues regarding the 
regulatory perimeter. Those issues arise in acute 
form in Table 1, where we see that around 60% 
of the total exposure of euro area banks to shadow 
banks is with entities outside the EU.
There are many reasons for concern about 
the vulnerabilities of shadow banks and their 
interconnections among themselves and with the 
banks. Intermediation has gone from regulated 
banks to shadow banks without prudential 
regulation, deposit insurance, or lender of last 
resort (LOLR). Using volatile short‑term funding 
(wholesale market) to finance long‑maturity 
assets entails liquidity mismatch and maturity 
mismatch. Financial innovation (some generated 
to avoid regulation) may create opaque securities, 
often held in banks’ off‑balance‑sheet vehicles. 
So a negative shock will come in a context where 
there are incentives for lenders to “run”, hence 
borrowers may face rollover risk. Asset managers 
like BlackRock and Vanguard hold huge positions 
in a wide range of assets that are also held by 
other entities. If redemptions were to force them 
to liquidate some of these positions, the market 
impact could be substantial, with effects on 
other holders of the assets. And then we have the 
substantial exposures of banks to shadow banks 
explored by Abad et al (2017). For completeness 
at this stage, we should also note the particular 
vulnerabilities discussed in the EU Shadow Banking 
Monitor 2017: derivatives markets and synthetic 
leverage, securities financing transactions (SFTs), 
wholesale funding markets, leveraged open‑ended 
funds doing significant maturity or liquidity 
transformation, and central counterparties (CCPs). 
There are specific reasons – in terms of liquidity 
transformation, maturity transformation, and 
leverage – for concern regarding these areas of 
the shadow banking system. 
Finally, we note that interconnectedness (financial 
integration) gives rise to the “financial trilemma” 
discussed by Cecchetti and Schoenholtz (2017) and 
Berner (2017), following Schoenmaker (2011). 
They posit the inconsistency of three major 
objectives: financial integration, financial stability, 
and national rather than supranational financial 
regulation. If we believe interconnectedness is 
not easily reversible, except as the consequence 
of a major crisis, and may indeed be desirable, 
then the argument suggests that we must choose 
supranational financial regulation if we wish 
to minimise financial instability. Many steps 
have been taken in this direction since the crisis, 
both through the FSB and the EU authorities, 
including for the latter the creation of several 
new supranational institutions.2 But the national 
regulatory bodies are still very much there, and 
in most cases the European authorities can issue 
only recommendations to them, rather than 
binding regulations. So there is considerable 
“ring‑fencing” and national policymaking that 
sometimes even stretches the limits of legality 
(EU regulations). The national authorities often put 
barriers in the way of cross‑border financial flows 
and institutional integration – i.e. they directly 
limit interconnectedness. This is one source of the 
financial disintegration we saw after 2006 and the 
slow recovery of financial integration.
2| Costs and benefits 
of interconnectedness
Financial integration eases the process of financial 
intermediation, moving funds from savers to 
investors. It also promotes portfolio diversification, 
the erosion of home bias, and hence risk sharing 
across asset holders and across borders. The deeper 
markets and more extensive network of financial 
institutions should favour investment and economic 
growth. But as we have noted, an environment 
with wider and deeper interconnections in the 
financial system can be more sensitive to large 
shocks that might then threaten financial stability. 
Interconnections can heighten systemic risk.
Cross‑border capital flows, facilitated by such 
interconnections, have long been recognised as a 
particular source of systemic risk. “Capital flow 
bonanzas” can lead to excessive domestic credit 
2 European Systemic 
Risk Board (ESRB), 
European Stability 
Mechanism (ESM), European 
Banking Authority (EBA), 
European Securities 
Markets Authority (ESMA), 
European Insurance and 
Occupational Pensions 
Authority (EIOPA), 
Single Supervisory 
Mechanism (SSM), 
Single Resolution Board (SRB).
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growth, which the home financial system may 
be unable to intermediate well. The inflows then 
go into unproductive uses that do not create the 
export capacities needed to finance repayment; 
more important for our purposes, they may feed 
the accumulation of vulnerabilities in domestic 
financial markets that create systemic instability, 
and a sudden reversal of the inflows can itself 
lead to a crisis. Moreover, if the capital inflows 
go into the non‑traded sectors, that will lead 
to an appreciation of the real exchange rate 
(relative price of traded and non‑traded goods); 
real exchange rate appreciation is the single most 
reliable forward‑looking indicator of financial 
crisis. And they are likely to contribute to asset 
price inflation, perhaps even bubbles. A common 
example is foreign investment in commercial real 
estate and housing.
Greater financial openness, integration, 
interconnectedness are likely to have contributed 
to the development of a global financial cycle, in 
which monetary impulses from financial centres 
(in particular, the United States) are transmitted to 
the rest of the world (Rey, 2016). This is doubtless 
related to the rising correlations of asset prices 
across financial markets. Together with the trend 
to passive investment (in index tracking funds 
and exchange‑traded funds) and a fixation on 
short‑term investment performance, this in turn 
creates a structural bias towards herd behaviour 
in asset management. 
Evidently, interconnectedness is not responsible 
for all the ills of modern finance, nor even for all 
sources of systemic instability. But we must not 
ignore that financial integration comes with costs 
as well as benefits. And this is one reason for the 
wider acceptance post‑crisis of the case for capital 
flow controls, as a potential macroprudential tool 
that could block some of the interconnections 
between domestic and foreign markets and the 
build‑up of balance‑sheet relationships between 
domestic and foreign entities. These can create 
special vulnerabilities if the domestic entities take 
on unhedged foreign currency liabilities.
Other macroprudential tools, such as limits on 
mortgage lending, seem to be less effective in 
financially more open economies and where 
financial systems are more sophisticated – i.e. where 
interconnections are deeper and more extensive 
(Cerutti et al., 2017). This empirical evidence on 
the effects of interconnectedness is directly relevant 
to structural vulnerabilities that might be created by 
CMU and efforts to mitigate such vulnerabilities.
3| Contagion
We must first distinguish between direct and 
indirect contagion, a distinction related to that 
between direct and indirect interconnectedness. 
Direct contagion occurs when following a negative 
shock, a counterparty to a transaction cannot or 
will not fulfil its commitments, so that there is a 
direct impact on the other counterparty. Indirect 
contagion can propagate through price effects or 
informational channels. Entities may be vulnerable 
to the same shocks, may have common exposures, 
may be perceived by markets to face related risks. 
If one must sell assets, others holding the same or 
related assets will experience a fall in their values 
that adversely affects their own balance sheets. 
Bad news about one firm may affect market 
perceptions of others and trigger hedging behaviour 
(Clerc et al., 2016). All these instances of both 
direct and indirect contagion operate through 
various forms of interconnections.
Informational contagion is of special interest 
in regard to asset managers. The higher the 
commonality of their portfolios, the greater the 
likelihood and extent of informational contagion, 
hence the greater the systemic impact of a shock 
perceived by one that becomes known to others 
(Allen et al., 2012). But there are also other systemic 
dangers posed by contagion that operates through 
bank ownership of asset managers, the extent of 
which we discussed above. Banks derive revenues 
from asset management fees and sales commissions; 
even if the entities in question may be off‑balance 
sheet for the bank, it might undertake credit and 
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liquidity risk in respect of the asset manager that 
brings step‑in risk; and market perceptions of 
problems in the asset management entity might 
bring reputational risk to the bank.
We note at this stage that conventional bank stress 
tests miss much if not all of these contagion effects, 
direct as well as indirect. But there is evidence that 
the second‑round or feedback effects of a shock 
to an entity, operating through contagion, are 
considerably greater than those of the initial shock. 
In an agent‑based model, Bookstaber et al. (2014) 
find that it is the “reaction to initial losses rather 
than the losses themselves that determine the 
extent of the crisis”. And because shadow banks are 
typically not individually as important systemically 
as large banks, their systemic importance derives 
from their interconnectedness and the contagion 
they can create. 
4| Where are the risks?
Different risky shadow banking activities concentrate 
in different segments of the shadow banking sector 
(ESRB, 2017). We find liquidity transformation 
mainly in real estate funds and bond funds. Maturity 
transformation is particularly great in bond funds. 
Leverage is highest in real estate funds and hedge 
funds. And since asset managers have corporate 
bond funds and increasingly do direct lending 
to non‑financial corporations, they undertake 
classic risks associated with credit intermediation.
There are more specific shadow banking risks, 
some of which are not yet well understood. 
One particularly opaque form of interconnectedness 
is the synthetic leverage created by use of derivatives. 
We now have the data to trace the interconnections, 
but the true extent of leverage created in this 
way is very hard to quantify in a form that gives 
comparability to conventional leverage. We do 
not even have a common definition of synthetic 
leverage at a global level. But ESRB (2017) clarifies 
it somewhat: “Synthetic leverage is a specific form 
of leverage which differs from financial leverage in 
so far as it does not involve outright borrowings. 
Leverage can be created synthetically by generating 
unfunded exposures through derivative instruments 
which do not fully show up on the balance sheet, 
thus allowing a financial institution to control a 
larger amount of exposures with a smaller amount 
of invested capital.” The risks are the same as with 
conventional leverage created through borrowing. 
Another growing risk in asset management, 
particularly important for real estate and bond 
funds, is the rising share of assets in “redeemable 
funds”, coupled with a trend decline in their liquid 
assets and portfolio shifts towards longer maturities 
(“search for yield”). Many now have redemption 
gates, but they have seldom been tested on a wide 
scale, and again interconnectedness might amplify 
the effects of doing so.
Perhaps the two most important examples of 
interconnections in the shadow banking sector are 
the repo markets and the central counterparty (CCP) 
set of entities. Much of the volume of activity in 
the repo markets is transactions between shadow 
banks and banks. Seizures in the repo markets are 
recognised to have been a key factor in the contagion 
observed after the failure of Lehman Brothers. 
The stated objective of CCPs is to reduce the 
likelihood of systemic risk arising from the failure 
of one counterparty and resulting chains of failure 
because of interconnectedness. But the size and 
complexity of the CCP sector and some of its 
individual entities, the inherent concentration risk, 
give cause for concern. Hence the authorities have 
rightly put considerable effort into designing rescue 
and resolution procedures for CCPs. Fortunately, 
they have not yet been tested.
Stress tests have not yet been applied in the shadow 
banking sector. We might think this a glaring 
omission on the part of the regulators, but the 
weaknesses of stress testing in the conventional 
banking sector suggest that it will be difficult. 
Even the most sophisticated stress tests applied 
to banks do not take account of direct contagion 
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through exposures, nor of indirect contagion 
through deleveraging and fire‑sale externalities. 
In the stress tests, the banks are passive, so the 
proxy for feedbacks is to increase the severity of 
the shocks (adverse scenario). This can be taken 
to the point of apparent absurdity. Cross‑border 
effects are typically ignored – e.g. a bank in 
the jurisdiction of country A may have a major 
subsidiary in country B, but the stress test for this 
bank will focus on impact of change in macro 
conditions in country A. There is no attempt to 
incorporate the shadow banking system into bank 
stress tests, much less to stress test the shadow 
banks. In short, it is difficult to see how stress tests 
as currently carried out can be useful in assessing 
system‑wide vulnerabilities.
5| Data
We have granular data on bank exposure to shadow 
banks (used in Abad et al., 2017). As yet, however, 
we do not have such data on the exposure of shadow 
banks to banks. Data that have been generated in 
response to the requirements of the Alternative 
Investment Funds Directive are in the hands of 
the national regulators, of which several have been 
dilatory in transferring them to the European 
Securities Markets Authority (ESMA). So there 
is as yet no such unified database which could be 
used by EU‑level regulators or academic researchers. 
Impatience is justified, because these are granular 
data on the holdings of alternative investment 
funds, which will illuminate their interconnections 
with the rest of the financial system.
The role of academics here is important. These are 
“big data”. Manipulating them and bringing out 
patterns, formulating appropriate models for 
empirical work and deriving results, all require 
the time and skills of experienced researchers. 
They may also be commercially sensitive, so 
it would not be possible to open them up to 
the private sector. But the possibilities have 
been illustrated by the success of collaborations 
between academics and staff from ECB and 
national authorities that have given rise to several 
papers recently published in the ESRB Working 
Paper Series. These use data generated by EMIR 
(European Market Infrastructure Regulation) 
reporting requirements. The data are collected 
by the ECB for every derivatives transaction 
effected within its jurisdiction. The research 
issues addressed include: “How is interest rate 
risk allocated within the banking sector and 
across other sectors?”; analysis of counterparty 
networks (interconnections!) in the centrally 
cleared interest rate derivatives markets in the EU; 
and measuring the systemic impact of a global 
adoption of multilateral portfolio compression 
in the EU over‑the‑counter (OTC) derivatives 
markets (interconnectedness, often explicitly in 
networks). These papers illustrate the tremendous 
potential payoffs offered by the availability of 
these data. The more recent Securities Financing 
Transactions Regulation will also generate data that 
can be used to understand the interconnections 
among banks and shadow banks in securities 
lending and repos.
This will enable us to map the shadow 
banking sector, i.e. to document and analyse 
interconnectedness. This work is essential to 
advance our understanding not only of shadow 
banking, but also of the overall environment 
within which CMU is to progress.
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